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Abstract
This paper builds on the idea that trust is a matter of embedded agency where trustors 
and trustees, as actors, interpret the social context in which they are embedded. Insofar 
as this context is institutionalized, trust may be quite ‘normal’ and achieved fairly easily 
by reference to institutionalized rules, roles and routines. However, trust always remains 
ambivalent and ultimately dependent on the actor’s leap of faith based on interpreta-
tion. Moreover, actors organize and enact the contexts they refer to. In this respect, trust 
is to be seen as an idiosyncratic accomplishment, actively constituted in more or less 
institutionalized contexts. It is therefore a fi rst aim of this paper to provide strong con-
ceptual support for the idea that trust can be based on institutions. However, it needs to 
be recognized as well that institutions become an object of trust once trustors are as-
sumed to rely on them. A closer examination of this issue is the second aim of this pa-
per. Moreover, institutional theory nowadays discusses questions of institutional change, 
institutionalization processes and the role of agency. Rather than being passive trustors 
who draw on institutions if and when they are established and reliable, actors are di-
rectly involved in the constitution of trust within and beyond the institutional context 
in which they fi nd themselves. A third aim of this paper is therefore to explore the new 
concept of ‘active trust’.
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag beruht auf der Vorstellung, dass Vertrauen im Rahmen einer „embedded 
agency“ zu verstehen ist, wobei Vertrauensgeber und -empfänger als Akteure den sozia-
len Kontext, in den sie eingebettet sind, interpretieren. Sofern dieser Kontext institu-
tionalisiert ist, kann Vertrauen durchaus „normal“ sein und sehr leicht mit Bezug auf 
institutionalisierte Regeln, Rollen und Routinen hergestellt werden. Vertrauen bleibt 
allerdings immer ambivalent und hängt letztlich von einem auf Interpretation basie-
renden Vertrauenssprung („leap of faith“) des Vertrauensgebers ab. Zudem werden die 
Kontexte, auf die sich Akteure beziehen, von diesen selbst organisiert und im Handeln 
konkretisiert. In dieser Hinsicht stellt Vertrauen somit immer auch eine individuelle 
Leistung dar und wird in mehr oder weniger institutionalisierten Kontexten aktiv kon-
stituiert. Ein erstes Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es daher, eine starke konzeptionelle Unter-
mauerung für die Idee zu liefern, dass Vertrauen auf Institutionen basieren kann.  Da-
mit werden jedoch die Institutionen selbst zu einem Objekt des Vertrauens. Diesem 
Sachverhalt genauer auf den Grund zu gehen, ist dann ein zweites Ziel dieses Beitrags. 
Ferner diskutiert die institutionalistische Forschung heute Fragen hinsichtlich des in-
stitutionellen Wandels, der Institutionalisierungsprozesse und der Rolle des Akteurhan-
delns. Statt von einem passiven Vertrauensgeber, der Institutionen nutzt, so sie denn 
etabliert und verlässlich sind, ist von Akteuren auszugehen, die direkt in die Konsti-
tution von Vertrauen innerhalb der Kontexte, in denen sie sich befi nden, und darüber 
hinaus involviert sind. Als drittes Ziel verfolgt der Beitrag daher eine Untersuchung des 
neueren Konstruktes des „aktiven Vertrauens“.
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Introduction
The notion that trust can be based on institutions has been widely accepted in the lit-
erature for many decades, if not centuries, in so far as sociologists and political scientists 
have sought to understand how social interaction requires – and produces – a reli-
able social order. It has also been adopted in certain parts of organization theory and 
management studies. For example, Reinhard Bachmann (1998) notes: ‘The foremost 
problems relating to the analysis of trust seem to be connected to the understanding 
of the role of the institutional environment in which business relations are embedded’ 
(p. 298). In this paper, I aim to contribute to this literature by presenting fundamental 
concepts from sociological neoinstitutionalism that are particularly powerful for an in-
stitutional explanation of trust. By introducing concepts such as ‘natural attitude’ and 
‘institutional isomorphism’ to the problem of trust, the diffi cult and, in my view, still 
underexplored question of how actors relate to institutions can be addressed. Admit-
tedly, what I refer to as ‘sociological neoinstitutionalism’ here is just one specifi c and not 
even terribly coherent stream of literature in the broad range of institutional theories, 
unifi ed only by some more or less direct connection with Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991) 
New Institutionalism volume. However, this work is able to fi ll many of the gaps left by 
other institutional approaches and, of course, by trust theories that do not take institu-
tions into account at all. In management and organization studies, in particular, the 
focus has been on individual cognition or interpersonal social-psychological processes, 
merely acknowledging some infl uence of the ‘environment’ or ‘context’ without further 
theorization (see, for example, the contributions in Kramer / Tyler 1996).
Sociological studies of trust, on the other hand, have tended to focus on the level of 
systems and institutions, attributing an almost marginal role to the trusting and trusted 
actors (Misztal 1996). However, actors interpret and question institutions and do not 
merely reproduce them passively. Therefore, if a theoretically sound case can be made 
for why institutions can be a source of trust between actors, it also needs to be recog-
nized again that institutions become an object of trust for the trustors who exercise 
agency in relying on them (or not). A closer examination of this issue is another aim of 
this paper. Clearly, without trust in institutions those institutions cannot be the source 
of institution-based trust in other actors. Again, this problem has long been recognized, 
A previous version of the paper was presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting in 
Honolulu, August 5–10, 2005 following a double-blind review, which provided useful suggestions 
for improvement, as did the feedback received at the conference. The German Research Foundation 
(DFG) kindly funded this conference trip. The paper will be published in the Handbook of Trust 
Research edited by Reinhard Bachmann and Aks Zaheer for Edward Elgar. I thank Aks Zaheer and 
an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to many colleagues for invalu-
able advice and encouragement, specifi cally, Patrik Aspers, Reinhard Bachmann, Jens Beckert, John 
Child, Chris Grey, Christel Lane and Jörg Sydow. This latest version has benefi ted from constructive 
criticism by Geny Piotti and Philip Manow in the internal review process of the Max Planck Institute 
for the Study of Societies. The points raised in the paper are discussed more fully in my book Trust: 
Reason, Routine, Refl exivity (Elsevier, forthcoming in 2006).
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for example by Georg Simmel ([1907] 1990) or more recently by Susan Shapiro (1987), 
but a systematic treatment of what makes institutions trustworthy and how actors in-
terpret and (thereby) come to trust institutions is still diffi cult to achieve, not least be-
cause it needs to evolve along with our advances and newly discovered challenges in 
institutional theory. This paper seeks to contribute towards this end.
The previous point connects research on trust with recent discussions in institutional 
theory about questions of institutional change, institutionalization processes and the 
role of agency. The institutions to which trust relates are not immutable themselves. 
More importantly, rather than assume a passive trustor who draws on institutions if and 
when they are established and reliable, we should see actors as being directly involved 
in the constitution of trust within and beyond the institutional context that they fi nd 
themselves in. A third aim of this paper is therefore to explore the new concept of ‘ac-
tive trust’, which Giddens (1994b) has introduced more or less in passing and which the 
trust literature has not really taken on board yet, although most writers on trust would 
probably agree that trustors are not merely passive carriers of trust (or mistrust). Once 
again, stronger conceptual foundations need to be created for trust to stand upon.
This paper builds on the idea that trust is a matter of embedded agency where trustors 
and trustees, as actors, interpret the social context in which they are embedded (see 
also Bachmann 1998; Möllering 2005). Insofar as this context is institutionalized, trust 
may be quite ‘normal’ and achieved fairly easily by reference to institutionalized rules, 
roles and routines. However, trust remains ambivalent and ultimately dependent on the 
actor’s leap of faith based on interpretation. Moreover, actors organize and enact the 
contexts they refer to. In this respect, trust is always more than just a social process or 
condition. It is also an idiosyncratic accomplishment, actively constituted in more or 
less institutionalized contexts.
A comprehensive defi nition of trust needs to take into account the rational, institu-
tional and processual references that enable the leap of faith towards trust to occur. 
Hence, I defi ne trust as a refl exive process of building on reason, routine and refl exivity, 
suspending irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty as if they were favourably 
resolved, and maintaining a state of favourable expectation towards the actions and in-
tentions of more or less specifi c others (Möllering 2006). The fi rst part of this defi nition 
highlights the rational element in trust: in other words, the idea that trust is a prudent 
choice based on an assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness (defi ned, for example, 
in terms of utility, benevolence, competence and / or integrity) occurring at a particular 
moment in time and in a certain way. This rationalistic view of trust is paradigmatic for 
much of the trust literature to date, but will not be discussed here, because I believe it is 
time (again) to look in more detail at other elements that are fundamental for a realistic 
understanding of trust. In particular, as outlined above, the roles of institutions and in-
terpretation beyond passive behaviour and mechanistic calculation have not been fully 
understood in trust research to date.
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The need to fi nd alternative explanations is evident, because rationalistic explanations 
regularly face the paradox that they either explain trust away or explain everything but 
trust (James 2002). Oliver Williamson (1993) has a point, for example, when he insists 
that rational choice theorists like James Coleman (1990) should not use the term ‘trust’ 
when what they really describe is ‘calculativeness’. On the other hand, the non-rational 
aspects of trust, by defi nition, simply cannot be dealt with by rationalist theories (Noote-
boom 2002). For example, the problems described by game theory or principal–agent 
theory tend to be ‘solved’ by reference to trust, implying the relaxation or abandonment 
of the key rationalist assumptions of the original frameworks (Ensminger 2001). Rea-
son certainly plays a role in trust and I discuss this at length in another context (Möl-
lering 2006). In this paper, however, I focus on one alternative approach derived mainly 
from one particular stream of sociological neoinstitutionalism, which differs from the 
essentially rational choice-oriented work represented, for example, in the publications 
of the Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust (see Cook 2001; or recently Cook et al. 
2005; Gambetta / Hamill 2005).
To be sure, rational choice theory recognizes the role of institutions as parameters of 
individual decisions, and one may also fi nd many empirical examples, especially in 
business, of situations in which the institutionalized legitimate form of action match-
es closely the behavioural assumptions made by rational choice theory (Bachmann 
1998). For example, managers are expected to justify their decisions in terms of a ‘hard’ 
cost–benefi t rationale. Privately, though, it is not considered inappropriate if the same 
managers go and buy a lottery ticket (an irrational decision since the expected value is 
clearly negative). However, this observation simply reinforces the need to apply a more 
general theory of institutions, in this case to questions of trust.
Specifi cally, the paper discusses trust in the light of the phenomenological roots of neo-
institutionalist theories. The rather uncommon idea of trust as institutional isomor-
phism is discussed in detail and with reference to constructs such as rules, roles and 
routines. This leads to an investigation of trust based on institutions, highlighting the 
idea that when institutions serve as a source of trust between actors, those institutions 
become objects of trust, too. The background to these considerations is that, because 
of its phenomenological roots, this neoinstitutionalist approach to trust does not deny 
agency (which would eliminate the relevance of trust). Rather, a more processual and 
interpretative perspective of embedded agency suggests itself. This will be presented in 
the fi nal part of the paper. More or less consciously, agents can contribute to the devel-
opment of the trust-inducing contexts, which, in turn, enable them to trust more eas-
ily. Anthony Giddens even describes ‘active trust’ as a contemporary kind of trust that 
needs to be constantly worked upon in the rather unstable contexts of late modernity.
At the very end of the paper, before the conclusion, it is shown that the key idea that 
any kind of trust requires a leap of faith can be traced back to classic contributions by 
Georg Simmel. This leap of faith needs to be restored in trust research because it delin-
eates ‘trust’ from rational choice and, thereby, lends it its specifi c and original meaning. 
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Research that ignores the leap of faith misses the essential element of trust and could 
therefore be superfl uous (replicating earlier studies on risk-taking or social condition-
ing) or even misleading (suggesting an unrealistic level of certainty or invulnerability). 
A stronger emphasis needs to be placed on the key role of actors’ idiosyncratic interpre-
tation and suspension of doubt in trust, because trust implies an ‘as-if ’ attitude which is 
ultimately realized at the actor level, notwithstanding the assumption that this impor-
tant element of agency in trust is socially embedded (see Möllering 2006).
Trust as a form of natural attitude
In this section, I will give an initial explanation for how institutions can be sources 
of trust, emphasizing the taken-for-grantedness implied in institutions. I will discuss 
whether manifestations of trust depend on how much an actor can take for granted in 
interactions with others. Without denying the potential value of other institutional ap-
proaches, I will focus on theoretical perspectives grouped liberally under the label of so-
ciological neoinstitutionalism (although several authors that I cite would not normally 
be called neoinstitutionalists). According to Ronald Jepperson (1991: 149),
institutions are socially constructed, routine-reproduced (ceteris paribus), program or rule sys-
tems. They operate as relative fi xtures of constraining environments and are accompanied by 
taken-for-granted accounts. This description accords with metaphors repeatedly invoked in dis-
cussions – metaphors of frameworks or rules. These imageries capture simultaneous contextual 
empowerment and constraint, and taken-for-grantedness.
If we want to argue that taken-for-grantedness in particular enables trust, then such a 
neoinstitutionalist approach needs to recall its roots in phenomenology and, specifi -
cally, Schütz’s concept of natural attitude. In this regard, Zucker (1986) is a rare but 
prominent example of a study of trust grounded fi rmly in neoinstitutionalist theory 
and, more importantly, explicitly in those phenomenological insights that make socio-
logical neoinstitutionalism distinct from other kinds of institutional analysis. In Zuck-
er’s defi nition ‘trust is a set of expectations shared by all those involved in an exchange’ 
including both ‘broad social rules’ and ‘legitimately activated processes’ (p. 54). When 
actors involved in an exchange share a set of expectations constituted in social rules and 
legitimate processes, they can trust each other with regard to the fulfi lment and mainte-
nance of those expectations. By the same token, actors can only trust those others with 
whom they share a particular set of expectations. Either way, trust hinges on the actors’ 
natural ability to have a world in common with others and rely on it. Zucker thus adopts 
a Garfi nkelian perspective on trust which, in turn, is based on the phenomenological 
work of Alfred Schütz.
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One central idea in Schütz’s theoretical writings is that the actor’s ‘natural attitude’ to-
wards the world becomes the starting point for the analysis of social reality, rather than 
being seen as the major obstacle to such analysis:
The object we shall be studying therefore is the human being who is looking at the world from 
within the natural attitude. Born into a social world, he comes upon his fellow men and takes 
their existence for granted without question, just as he takes for granted the existence of the 
natural objects he encounters. (Schütz 1967: 98)
This natural attitude (sometimes also translated as ‘attitude of daily life’ or a similar 
expression) captures the observation that actors normally do not doubt the reality of 
their everyday world and can thus have a ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt), meaning a fairly stable 
subjective reality in which individuals experience and conduct their daily affairs prag-
matically and without questioning this reality. Moreover, as part of the natural attitude, 
actors assume that other people’s view of reality is not too different from their own. The 
accomplishment of ‘reciprocal perspectives’ (Schütz 1970b: 184) is that the everyday 
world is largely a ‘world known in common with others’ or a ‘common-sense world’ 
(Garfi nkel 1963).
Schütz (1967) reveals that a precondition for social interaction is taken-for-granted-
ness, which he defi nes as ‘that particular level of experience which presents itself as not 
in need of further analysis’ (p. 74). However, it is clear from his writings that he does 
not take the natural attitude as such for granted. Instead, he is also concerned with how 
actors retain the facility to interpret part of their lifeworlds with an attitude of doubt or 
curiosity (Garfi nkel 1963). This epoché of the natural attitude – meaning the possibil-
ity of suspending the natural attitude – presents actors as rather skilful in handling the 
duality of familiarity and unfamiliarity in their stream of experiences (Schütz 1970a; 
see also Endreß 2001).
Harold Garfi nkel (1963) draws on and interprets Schütz’s concept of the natural at-
titude when he states that ‘[t]he attitude of daily life furnishes a person’s perceived en-
vironment its defi nition as an environment of social realities known in common’ and 
that it ‘is constitutive of the institutionalized common understandings of the practi-
cal everyday organization and workings of the society as seen “from within”’ (p. 235). 
The constitutive features of basic rules of a game serve Garfi nkel as a heuristic for un-
derstanding stable social interaction: in particular, basic rules are constituted by three 
‘constitutive expectancies’ (p. 190) by which players expect (a) the rules to frame a set 
of required alternative moves and outcomes, (b) the rules to be binding on all other 
players and (c) the other players to equally expect (a) and (b). Crucially, Garfi nkel con-
cludes that ‘basic rules frame the set of possible events of play that observed behavior 
can signify’ and ‘provide a behavior’s sense as an action’ (p. 195), that is they literally 
defi ne what can happen and has happened.
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Garfi nkel (1963, 1967) therefore sets out in his (in)famous breaching experiments to 
manipulate social interactions in such a way that the infringement of basic rules causes 
surprise, confusion, anomie and other kinds of strong irritation in the subjects of the 
experiments, thereby aiming to reveal the fundamental social structures that are ordi-
narily, routinely and tacitly referred to and reproduced in everyday life. He shows how 
actors quite actively ‘normalize’ and redefi ne events that fall outside of basic rules in 
order to maintain ‘the game’, in other words the perceived normality and stability of the 
social context (see also McKnight et al. 1998).
What makes Garfi nkel’s interpretation of the natural attitude particularly interesting 
for this study is that it includes a concept of ‘trust’ (mostly set in inverted commas by 
him) which I regard as fundamental to the natural-attitude view of trust: ‘To say that 
one person “trusts” another means that the person seeks to act in such a fashion as to 
produce through his action or to respect as conditions of play actual events that accord 
with normative orders of events depicted in the basic rules of play’ and ‘the player takes 
for granted the basic rules of the game as a defi nition of his situation, and that means 
of course as a defi nition of his relationships to others’ (Garfi nkel 1963: 193–194). This 
means, on the one hand, that people trust each other if their interactions are governed 
by the three constitutive expectancies listed above. If this is the case, then trust can 
be regarded more generally as ‘a condition for “grasping” the events of daily life’ (p. 
190). Moreover, though, compliance with basic rules and constitutive expectancies also 
means reliance on them. Trust in the natural attitude means interacting with others on 
the basis that everyone knows and accepts basic rules for the interaction.
Building on this, Lynne Zucker (1977; see also Zucker 1983, 1987) notes that institu-
tionalization can be seen as a process of defi ning social reality or as a property of an 
act as socially more or less taken for granted. For example, institutionalizing a ban on 
child labour is a process (re)producing social defi nitions of childhood and labour. And 
it depends on the time and place to what degree such a ban has the property of being 
taken for granted. Thus Zucker emphasizes on the one hand that objective reality or 
social facts may persist even when they are not internalized and on the other hand that 
the degree of institutionalization can vary from high to low (Jepperson 1991). Highly 
institutionalized acts have ready-made accounts, meaning that they are easily legiti-
mated, while less institutionalized acts are not so taken-for-granted and therefore will 
not infl uence the behaviour of others as strongly. 
In Zucker (1986), however, the author argues historically with reference to the econom-
ic structure of the United States in 1840–1920 that institutions have become more and 
more necessary and important. Viewing trust as a precondition for economic exchang-
es (Arrow 1974), defi ning it with Garfi nkel (1963) as a set of shared background and 
constitutive expectations, and noting certain similarities as well as dissimilarities with 
Durkheim’s (1984) types of pre-contractual solidarity, Zucker (1986) identifi es and ex-
amines three central modes of trust production, that is three different ways in which 
actors establish a world known in common and the rules for their interaction. First, ‘pro-
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cess-based trust’ is tied to past or expected exchanges between specifi c actors which can 
be fi rst-hand or by reputation. These exchanges enable them to produce a basis for their 
interactions that cannot be extended outside of their relationship and are therefore not 
institutionalized. Second, ‘characteristic-based trust’ is produced through social simi-
larity between actors, meaning that it is tied to persons possessing certain stable char-
acteristics (for example, family background, ethnicity, sex) but already generalized to 
some degree, as externally ascribed characteristics activate expectations about common 
understandings. Third, ‘institutional-based trust’ describes sets of shared expectations 
derived from formal social structures represented, for example, by signals of member-
ship of professions or associations or by intermediary mechanisms such as bureaucracy, 
banking and legal regulation. 
Hence, according to Zucker (1986) institutions can enable trust between actors and 
such trust can then even be institutionalized when the underlying shared expectations 
are relatively independent of time and space. Note, though, that in Zucker’s account and 
as pointed out similarly by Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1991) and others, institu-
tions as intermediary mechanisms are not seen (primarily) as a third-party guarantor 
and enforcer – as they would be in rationalist theories of trust – but as systems of rules and 
meanings that provide common expectations which defi ne the actors as social beings.
Trust as a form of institutional isomorphism
While the previous section has introduced the natural attitude as part of the conceptual 
foundations for the idea that trust springs from taken-for-grantedness, in this section I 
borrow the concept of isomorphism from neoinstitutionalist organization theory (spe-
cifi cally Meyer / Rowan 1977; DiMaggio / Powell 1983) to argue further that manifes-
tations of trust may be explained to a considerable degree by institutionalization: the 
trustor A trusts (or distrusts) the trustee B in a certain matter because it is natural and 
legitimate to do so and ‘everybody would do it’. For similar reasons, trustee B will hon-
our the trust (or not). Note that, in this pure sense, the question of the utility of trust is 
detached from the institutionally required acts.
The last point just noted refl ects the provocative claims by John Meyer and Brian Rowan 
(1977), who argue ‘that the formal structures of many organizations … dramatically 
refl ect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their 
work activities’ (p. 341). According to these authors, myths are rationalized, impersonal 
prescriptions with rule-like specifi cations about the appropriate means to pursue pre-
scribed purposes. Moreover, myths are highly institutionalized, which means that they 
are taken for granted as legitimate and beyond the discretion of individual actors. On 
the one hand, Meyer and Rowan (1977) identify isomorphism as the process of adapt-
ing (systems of) action to match and imitate institutional requirements. On the other 
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hand, this is seen as mere ‘dramatic enactments of the rationalized myths pervading 
modern societies’ (p. 346). In other words, myths are only complied with on the surface; 
a legitimate façade is constructed, ‘decoupled’ from the actual action. Translating this 
argument from formal organizational structures to trust, the question arises whether 
seemingly trustful interactions may equally be little more than dramatic enactment and 
ceremony. It could thus be the case that actors are not really trusting or trustworthy, 
but the same sequence of action unfolds as if they were. They put up ‘façades of trust’ 
(Hardy et al. 1998) while their trust is actually ‘spurious’ (Fox 1974). However, Meyer 
and Rowan’s (1977) concept of isomorphism introduces an instrumentalism that sepa-
rates the actor level too much from the institutional and societal level and therefore 
runs the risk of losing major phenomenological insights that are fundamental to neo-
institutionalist theories.
Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1983) manage to alleviate this problem by dis-
tinguishing between different types and mechanisms of isomorphism. Starting with 
Hawley’s (1968) basic defi nition of isomorphism as a constraining process that forces 
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environ-
mental conditions, one type of isomorphism can be labelled ‘competitive’ according to 
DiMaggio and Powell. It subsumes on the one hand population ecology explanations 
(for example Hannan / Freeman 1977) that attribute the similarity of units in a popula-
tion to the evolutionary superiority of their properties. On the other hand, competitive 
isomorphism can also subsume instrumental imitation: in other words, the deliberate 
copying of other units which are doing well. In terms of trust, competitive isomorphism 
would thus mean that in certain contexts actors generally trust each other because this 
practice has emerged as more successful than not trusting. In other contexts, distrust 
may have been selected over time as a more effi cient practice than trust. (Note that 
the theory underlying the concept of competitive isomorphism assumes rational utility 
maximizers and / or disinterested evolutionary forces, leaving little room for agency.)
The other, more open, and hence for the present discussion more relevant, type of iso-
morphism distinguished by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is called ‘institutional iso-
morphism’ and is subdivided for analytical purposes into three mechanisms: coercive, 
mimetic and normative isomorphism. First, coercive isomorphism stems from external 
pressure to conform in order to gain legitimacy. The pressure may be implicit or explicit 
and the sanctions against nonconformity may be more or less severe, but this mecha-
nism is mainly one of avoiding a lack of legitimacy. It matches Meyer and Rowan’s 
(1977) argument that avoidance of coercion means enacting and upholding objective 
myth and ceremony, decoupled from subjective content and utility. Whether coercive 
isomorphism should be categorized as institutional is debatable. Zucker (1977), for ex-
ample, argues that ‘applying sanctions to institutionalized acts may actually have the 
effect of deinstitutionalizing them’ (p. 728). The need for coercion gives rise to doubts 
about the validity of the legitimation for the respective institution (see also Zucker 
1987). For trust in particular, the idea of trusting or being trustworthy just because of 
external pressure is not seen as a durable basis for social interaction (except in rational-
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ist accounts). The idea of trust as coercive institutional isomorphism may still apply, 
though, if the external pressure is predominantly latent but gives ‘structural assurance’ 
(McKnight et al. 1998: 479).
The second mechanism of institutional isomorphism identifi ed by DiMaggio and Pow-
ell (1983) is mimicry (‘mimetic processes’, p. 151) or ‘modelling’ (Galaskiewicz / Was-
serman 1989). Here, an actor imitates, implicitly or explicitly, the behaviour of another. 
This mechanism applies especially in contexts of high uncertainty and ambiguity where 
legitimacy can be obtained by doing as everybody else or a recognized referent does. 
The act as such is detached from its utility and reduced to the question of ‘appropriate-
ness’ (March / Olsen 1989). Considering trust according to this logic, actors who do not 
know if it is prudent to place or honour trust will do whatever (relevant) others would 
normally do in this situation.
Third, normative isomorphism entails the general principle that socialization instils 
particular cognitive bases and legitimations in the actors subject to them (DiMag-
gio / Powell 1983). This mechanism comes closest to the idea of a natural attitude and 
the view that institutions frame how actors can grasp their lifeworld and relate to it in 
their actions. Role expectations are learned and fulfi lled because they go hand in hand 
with the actor’s self-image or identity and ‘what such a person must do’. Once actors 
have internalized norms and accepted roles associated with a part of their lifeworld, 
they enact those roles mostly implicitly but at times also explicitly. This produces iso-
morphism in the sense that all actors who play the same institutionalized role will do 
so in a standard, recognized, legitimate way. Trust as normative isomorphism would 
thus mean that actors who have been socialized to place or honour trust in certain 
types of situation will conform to this expectation, because otherwise they would be 
going against their own nature or against the objective reality of society (Zucker 1986). 
Interestingly, this conformity means at the same time that the actor is able to main-
tain self-respect and integrity, that is, a favourable identity or self-image. This view of 
isomorphic, unquestioned trust can explain, for example, manifestations of trust that 
cannot be explained by calculativeness.
Rules, roles and routines
Although there is currently no established neoinstitutionalist school of trust research 
and the above sections only identify a few concepts that it might entail, the trust litera-
ture contains many relevant references to rules, roles and routines as bases for trust. 
Some of this literature will be reviewed briefl y in this section in order to show that 
arguments building on notions of natural attitude and institutional isomorphism are 
not uncommon. For example, if the main problem of trust is not opportunism but the 
ability to engage in meaningful interaction in the fi rst place, then contract law, trade as-
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sociations and technical standards are social institutions that embody systems of rules 
for interaction and thus a basis for trust, if rules are understood as cultural meaning 
systems (Lane 1997). A similar logic applies to the idea that trust can be based on roles. 
For example, when Bernard Barber (1983) identifi es the ‘expectation of technically 
competent role performance’ (p. 9) as one key element of trust, he already presupposes 
institutionalized roles or what he calls ‘shorthand ways of referring to complex patterns 
of expectations among actors’ which make it possible to trust (or distrust) a role incum-
bent. The ‘swift trust’ in temporary systems described by Debra Meyerson, Karl Weick 
and Roderick Kramer (1996) is a special but highly illustrative example of how reliance 
on clearly defi ned roles makes trustful interactions possible even when these interac-
tions are relatively isolated and transient as, for instance, in project work: ‘If people in 
temporary systems deal with one another more as roles than as individuals … then 
expectations should be more stable, less capricious, more standardized, and defi ned 
more in terms of tasks and specialities than personalities’ (p. 173). Thus roles carry the 
taken-for-granted expectations on which trust can be based.
The concept of role is also central to Adam Seligman’s (1997) social-philosophical anal-
ysis of trust, but in his framework reliance on role expectations merely leads to ‘confi -
dence’, whereas the problem of ‘trust’ only arises in the face of role negotiability: ‘Trust 
is something that enters into social relations when there is role negotiability, in what 
may be termed the “open spaces” of roles and role expectations’ (pp. 24–25). Selig-
man claims that pervasive role negotiability is a defi ning aspect of modernity and stems 
from the proliferation of roles, ensuing dissonances and gaps in (no longer) taken-for-
granted defi nitions of roles. While Seligman’s account thus points to the limits of the 
institutional approach, the unconditionality that to him characterizes trust may not be 
too different from the Schützian natural attitude, where actors play an active part in 
interpreting their lifeworlds, normalizing events and socially constructing reality. At 
least Seligman supports the view that role expectations are a basis for confi dence. If we 
assume further that all roles may in principle be negotiable but cannot be negotiated 
all at once, then Seligman’s ‘confi dence’ and ‘trust’ have to go hand in hand, requiring 
a kind of Garfi nkelian constitutive expectancy that at any given moment in time most 
role expectations will not be negotiated. After all, even Garfi nkel’s experiments would 
not have ‘worked’ (in the sense of producing meaningful fi ndings) if he and his students 
had breached all rules and roles at once, which would be diffi cult to imagine anyway.
Finally, routines are introduced here as a third heuristic alongside rules and roles in or-
der to lend the notion of trust based on institutions greater plasticity. Routines are regu-
larly and habitually performed programmes of action or procedures. They may or may 
not be supported by corresponding (systems of) rules and / or roles, and they represent 
institutions in as much as they are typifi ed, objectivated and legitimated, not senseless 
repetitions, although their sense is mostly tacit and taken-for-granted whilst they are 
performed (Scott 2001). As with rules and roles, ‘the reality of everyday life maintains 
itself by being embodied in routines’ (Berger / Luckmann 1966: 149). Similarly, Anthony 
Giddens (1984) points out: ‘Routine is integral both to the continuity of the personality 
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of the agent, as he or she moves along the paths of daily activities, and to the institu-
tions of society, which are such only through their continued reproduction’ (p. 60). By 
implication, the placing and honouring of trust itself is seen as part of the routine. For 
example, most parents will not fret every morning when their child leaves for school, 
because entrusting the child to the care of bus drivers, teachers and others is part of a 
daily routine. However, this brings up a higher-order problem of trust again: trust in the 
reliability of the routine in continuously producing the same (range of) outcomes and 
more importantly trust in the motivation and ability of the actors involved not to devi-
ate from the programme of action – for whatever reason. Agency cannot be explained 
away (Feldman / Pentland 2003).
In sum, rules, roles and routines are bases for trust in so far as they represent taken-
for-granted expectations that give meaning to, but cannot guarantee, their fulfi lment 
in action. However, this explanation has to be incomplete, because a neoinstitutionalist 
view affords both the trustor and the trustee a non-passive role in challenging, changing 
and cheating the institutions, albeit not all of them all at once and all the time. This no-
tion of agency (DiMaggio 1988; Beckert 1999) will be addressed later, but fi rst I should 
perhaps pursue the simpler issue that a trustor who trusts on the basis of institutions 
needs to have trust in those institutions, given that they cannot be assumed to be infal-
lible and immutable.
Trust in institutions
Lynne Zucker’s (1986) ‘institutional-based trust’ is conceptually interesting and, accord-
ing to her, empirically vital because it implies that a trustor can trust a trustee without 
establishing ‘process-based trust’ in a personal relationship. However, as Jörg Sydow 
(1998) argues, this makes institutions an object of trust, too, and not only a source. An 
analytical distinction therefore has to be drawn between the infl uence that institutions 
have on the trustor–trustee relationship on the one hand and the trust that actors have 
in the institutions on the other (see also Bachmann 1998). This latter notion of trust 
in the system, in particular at the societal level, has been the main area of interest in a 
signifi cant part of the trust literature, notably political science-orientated work, such 
as Barber (1983), Dunn (1988), Coleman (1990), Fukuyama (1995), Putnam (1995), 
Sztompka (1999), Warren (1999) and Cook (2001), as well as those studies analysing 
trust items in large-scale surveys like the General Social Survey in the United States (for 
example Paxton 1999; Glaeser et al. 2000). Niklas Luhmann’s (1979) assertion that ‘the 
old theme of political trust … has virtually disappeared from contemporary political 
theory’ (p. 54) no longer applies.
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In this regard it is interesting to note that Barbara Misztal (1996) presumes that the 
concern for trust in the social sciences has been – from the classics to the present day 
– above all else a search for the bases of social order, that is a dependable social system. 
The requirement of ‘trust in the system’ is already evident for Hobbes’ Leviathan just 
as much as for Locke’s social contract (see, for example, Dunn 1988). What this means 
for modernity and beyond the question of government has been expressed by Georg 
Simmel ([1907] 1990), who in his discussion of the transition from material money to 
credit money notes that ‘the feeling of personal security that the possession of money 
gives is perhaps the most concentrated and pointed form and manifestation of confi -
dence in the socio-political organization and order’ (p. 179). Niklas Luhmann (1979) 
introduces his concept of ‘system trust’ by refl ecting on money, too, and supposes that 
an actor ‘who trusts in the stability of the value of money … basically assumes that a 
system is functioning and places his trust in that function, not in people’ (p. 50). Ac-
cording to Luhmann, system trust builds up through continual, affi rmative experiences 
with the system. It grows and persists precisely because it is impersonal, diffuse and rests 
on generalization and indifference.
Interestingly, Luhmann suggests that abstract systems should have inbuilt controls which 
can be maintained by experts. Actors do not need to trust in an impenetrable system 
as a whole but ‘only’ in the functioning of controls. In stark contrast to Susan Shapiro 
(1987), Luhmann does not see an infi nite regress of controlling the controls and thus the 
danger of a spiral of distrust. Moreover, according to Luhmann, system trust also rests 
on the actor’s assumption that everybody else trusts the system, too. While the assur-
ances of experts and others thus give a ‘certainty-equivalent’, system trust overall means 
confi dence in an unavoidable, disinterested and abstract entity (Luhmann 1988).
Luhmann does not address a point implicit in his trust concept which I regard as cru-
cial, namely that trust is essentially not so much a choice between one course of action 
(trusting) and the other (distrusting), but between either accepting a given level of as-
surance or looking for further controls and safeguards. System trust (and also personal 
trust) fails or cannot even be said to exist when this state of suspending doubt is not 
reached. The ‘infl ationary spiral of escalating trust relationships and the paradox that 
the more we control the institution of trust, the more dissatisfi ed we will be with its of-
ferings’ attested by Shapiro (1987) for modern societies, where ‘the guardians of trust 
are themselves trustees’ (p. 652), are only set in motion if the response to a need for trust 
is always the installation of more controls, instead of being satisfi ed at some point that 
the system apparently ‘works’. In particular, Anthony Giddens (1990) captures more 
lucidly than Luhmann how actors can have trust in abstract systems or institutions. He 
describes the ‘access points’ where the actor experiences the system by interacting with 
other actors, typically experts who represent the system. Patients, for example, develop 
trust (or distrust) in the medical system to a large extent through their experiences with 
doctors and other medical professionals, such as nurses and midwives, who represent 
and ‘embody’ the institutions of medicine (see Parsons 1978; and more recently McKneally 
et al. 2004; Brownlie / Howson 2005; Lowe 2005).
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However, as Luhmann pointed out, too, the object of system trust is indeed the system 
as such, but since it is impossible for individual actors to comprehend the system, they 
can only assure themselves of its proper functioning through the re-embedded per-
formances of experts who refer to and represent a particular system. Giddens (1990) 
goes further than Luhmann (1979) and places a different emphasis, because he does 
not see the role of experts primarily in controlling the system but in bringing it to 
life. According to Giddens (1990), if trust in systems is ‘faceless’ and trust in persons 
involves ‘facework’, then systems obtain a ‘face’ at their ‘access points’, which sustains or 
transforms ‘faceless commitments’ (p. 88). This interplay of disembedding and re-em-
bedding is not unproblematic, which Giddens demonstrates by describing, on the one 
hand, how carefully system representatives design their performances in order to quell 
doubts about the system’s functioning while, on the other, actors pragmatically accept 
the system but also retain an attitude of scepticism. Trust in an institution means con-
fi dence in the institution’s reliable functioning, but this has to be based mainly on trust 
in visible controls or representative performances rather than on the internal workings 
of the institution as a whole.
Institutions can be seen as bases, carriers and objects of trust: trust between actors can 
be based on institutions, trust can be institutionalized, and institutions themselves can 
only be effective if they are trusted (see also Child / Möllering 2003). While this is per-
fectly in line with sociological neoinstitutionalism, it has become apparent from the 
evidence presented that this approach reveals, but does not fully explain, how actors 
achieve the natural attitude, the acceptance of normality, the assumption of good faith 
and similar notions that actually point towards the imperfection of institutions. Hence, 
a more elaborate development of this approach will also have to face the questions 
which currently plague neoinstitutionalism. For example, let us consider the discus-
sions about the ‘institutional entrepreneur’ (DiMaggio 1988) as an actor who plays an 
outstanding role in refl exively creating, preserving and changing specifi c institutions 
(see also Beckert 1999). Can a corresponding role be conceived for a kind of ‘trust en-
trepreneur’ who actively shapes context in a trust-enhancing manner?
Active constitution of trust
So far, I have stressed the actor’s reliance on institutions, implying a rather passive role 
for trustors. In the following sections, I will argue that all trust – even when it is based 
on taken-for-granted institutions – is not just passive but requires an as-if attitude on 
the part of the trustor which renders irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty 
unproblematic. And in less institutionalized contexts, trust becomes even more a kind 
of ‘active trust’ (Giddens 1994b) in the sense of the trustor actively engaging in a process 
of trust development. This process may begin ‘blindly’. However, trustors need not fool-
ishly or heroically enter into such a process but may rather initiate the trust building 
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process with small steps. Over time, trust then evolves with the relationship, ideally in a 
self-reinforcing fashion, as familiarity increases. The concept of active trust highlights 
furthermore that trust should be seen as a continuous process of refl exive constitution 
which requires mutual openness and intensive communication. The trust literature to 
date mainly sees trust as an active choice in given circumstances. The following sections 
go beyond these notions by identifying ways in which actors actively infl uence the cir-
cumstances for their trusting choices. There is a ‘creative element’ (Beckert 2005: 20) in 
trust.
To start with, ‘blind trust’ can actually be quite functional: unintentional, coincidental 
behaviour may trigger a process of desirable interactions that could not have been will-
ingly produced as easily. Moreover, Russell Hardin (1993) makes repeated reference to 
the idea of strategic ‘as-if trust’ alongside trust based on encapsulated interest. Accord-
ingly, an actor who thinks that trust would be desirable, but cannot rationally trust the 
potential trustee yet, may nevertheless choose to feign trust with the aim of building 
up genuine trust. Hardin envisages ‘as-if trust’ to be used when the trustor only has a 
vague notion that a trustful, cooperative relationship with the potential trustee could 
be benefi cial. However, it is diffi cult to determine within a rational choice framework 
how much non-rationality will be rational for the actor in such an uncertain context, 
meaning that it is hard to judge rationally when it is rational to be non-rational (Good 
1988: 42). Trust therefore remains at least partly non-rational itself: The trustor just 
does it. Not the rational validity of expectations and generalizations as such but their 
availability in the fi rst place is what makes trust functional. ‘Trust begins where predic-
tion ends’ (Lewis / Weigert 1985: 976) and all that matters is that trust emerges at all. Ac-
tors may choose to trust blindly in order to overcome rational or institutional vacuums 
and paradoxes.
Hardin (1993) clearly presents the strategy of as-if trust as a temporary solution which 
enables a process whereby the trustor can gradually cease to feign trust because genuine 
trust develops. Moreover, if trust is generally functional in that it reduces social com-
plexity, it does not necessarily mean that trust has to reduce complexity immediately or 
completely. Instead a ‘principle of gradualness’ (Luhmann 1979: 41) can be followed. 
Trust is generated and extended step by step, beginning with relatively small steps. This 
implies that trust building requires time and may be rather tentative. This was already 
understood by Peter Blau, who thought of trust as evolving and expanding gradually in 
parallel to social associations from minor initial transactions: ‘[T]he process of social 
exchange leads to the trust required for it in a self-governing fashion’ (Blau 1968: 454; 
see also Blau 1964).
A possible explanation for the mechanism identifi ed by Blau is given by Dale Zand 
(1972), who presents a ‘spiral reinforcement model of the dynamics of trust’ (p. 233). 
According to this model, high initial trust will lead the actor A to disclose information, 
accept infl uence and reduce control, which the other actor B perceives as positive signs 
of trustworthiness that increase B’s level of trust and induce similarly open behaviour. 
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This reinforces A’s initial trust and thus leads to further trusting action, reinforcing B’s 
trust and so forth. In other words, expectations of trust and the resultant action would 
be a typical example of a self-fulfi lling prophecy. This perspective of trust based on 
positive experience matches Lynne Zucker’s concept of ‘process-based trust’ (already 
mentioned above). Zucker (1986) states that process-based trust is ‘tied to past or ex-
pected exchange such as in reputation or gift-exchange’ and informed by ‘a record of 
prior exchange, often obtained second-hand or by imputation from outcomes of prior 
exchange’ (p. 60). Actors establish an exchange history analogous to the traditional giv-
ing of gifts and counter-gifts (Mauss [1925] 1954; Blau 1964), which involves a trust-
inducing time lapse and a formation of mutual expectations of reciprocity.
The notion that trust develops gradually and grows with mutual experience in rela-
tionships over time is also captured very instructively in a well-known model by Roy 
Lewicki and Barbara Bunker (1996). They describe three types of trust that serve to 
illustrate the stages of trust development over time. They argue that in the fi rst stage 
of a new relationship ‘calculus-based trust’ is required. It rests on calculative reasoning 
about the other’s incentives to maintain the relationship and the deterrents prevent-
ing him from breaking trust. Where calculus-based trust proves to be valid, the actors 
may get to know each other better and understand each other’s needs, preferences and 
priorities more generally so that, in the second stage, ‘knowledge-based trust’ develops, 
which ‘is grounded in the other’s predictability – knowing the other suffi ciently well 
so that the other’s behavior is anticipatable’ (p. 121). Interestingly, Lewicki and Bunker 
point out that not all relationships develop knowledge-based trust on top of calculus-
based trust: some relationships will stabilize just on a calculus level, though many re-
lationships do reach knowledge-based trust because the getting-to-know-each-other is 
almost inevitable. A few relationships may even evolve after some more time to the stage 
of ‘identifi cation-based trust’, where the ‘parties effectively understand and appreciate 
the other’s wants’ and ‘each can effectively act for the other’ (p. 122). Although calculus 
and knowledge are still present as bases for trust, identifi cation with the other’s desires 
and intentions becomes the perceptual paradigm for the actors. Lewicki and Bunker il-
lustrate that trust does not simply grow stronger over time but the ‘frame’ in which the 
actors consider trust changes as trust develops, so that the issues faced at an early stage 
should be very different from those in a long-established, identifi cation-based trust re-
lationship.
Although there are important differences between the process concepts of trust pro-
posed by different authors discussed in this section and although it may be debatable 
whether the stages and phases of trust development will follow exactly the patterns sug-
gested, an overall conclusion common to all of these contributions can be drawn: actors 
do not need to trust each other fully right from the beginning of a relationship, because 
they can engage experimentally in a kind of as-if trust which may gradually produce 
genuine trust. While such a process may simply emerge, the more interesting possibility 
is that actors may actively produce mutual experiences with the aim of testing whether 
a trust relationship is feasible, but without being able to know in advance the associated 
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benefi ts and risks. It follows again that an essential feature of trust and its development 
must be the actor’s ability to ‘just do it’ and overcome, at least momentarily, the irreduc-
ible uncertainty and vulnerability involved in social exchanges.
Familiarity, unfamiliarity and familiarization
According to Luhmann (1979) ‘trust is only possible within a familiar world’ (p. 20) 
and, in line with the neoinstitutional approach, the presence of many familiar elements 
in an interaction context positively infl uences the actor’s ability to confer or deny trust 
(Luhmann 1988). The concept of familiarity recalls the discussion on trust and institu-
tions presented above, because familiarity essentially represents taken-for-grantedness 
and the ‘natural attitude’ that actors have towards their lifeworld. However, the main 
points of interest here are how actors deal with and overcome unfamiliarity and how 
they may be able to develop trust (gradually) in contexts of low familiarity through a 
process of familiarization. 
Familiarity in Alfred Schütz’s terms (1970a) ‘demarcates, for the particular subject in 
his concretely particular life-situation, that sector of the world which does from that 
which does not need further investigation’ (p. 61). Objects regarded as familiar are ‘be-
yond question’ and thus ‘taken for granted’. Familiarity requires the natural attitude as it 
‘presupposes the idealizations of the “and so forth and so on” and the “I can do it again”’ 
(p. 58). Another way of interpreting familiarity, according to Schütz, is that it expresses 
‘the likelihood of referring new experiences, in respect of their types, to the habitual 
stock of already acquired knowledge … by means of a passive synthesis of recognition’ 
(pp. 58–59). In other words, even a new object can be suffi ciently familiar to the actor 
if it can be recognized as typical. This indicates, however, that familiarity implies the 
unfamiliar, too, at least in two respects. First, ‘the now unquestioned world … is merely 
unquestioned until further notice’ (p. 61), meaning that all that the actor is subjectively 
familiar with could in principle be questioned. Second, unfamiliarity is not just some-
thing that actors can choose to direct their attention towards and question if and when 
they please, but rather something that actors cannot avoid because ‘unfamiliar experi-
ence imposes itself upon us by its very unfamiliarity’ (p. 28) and becomes thematic and 
topical whether the actor likes it or not, especially in processes of social interaction. 
Schütz does not see the actor as locked into the natural attitude but as able to respond 
constructively to ‘imposed relevance’ when prompted to in the stream of experience. If 
trust builds on familiarity, then the good news from Schütz is that unfamiliarity need 
not automatically mean distrust as long as the actor uses his capacity of familiarization 
to increase his familiarity when necessary.
Like Schütz, Luhmann (1988) sees an intimate connection between the familiar and 
the unfamiliar, because the underlying distinction can re-enter its own space through 
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the process of familiarization: ‘We can live within a familiar world because we can, us-
ing symbols, reintroduce the unfamiliar into the familiar’ (p. 95). However, ‘we know 
in a familiar way about the unfamiliar’ (p. 95), which means that Schütz’s ‘imposed 
relevance’ of the unfamiliar can only be dealt with in familiar terms. Thus, familiariza-
tion shifts the boundaries of familiarity from within. Unfamiliarity only renders trust 
impossible when the actor fails to engage in familiarization. 
Trust in this sense relies on both familiarity and familiarization. Hence, trust requires 
familiarity, but the two concepts must not be confused (Luhmann 1988). Rather, ac-
cording to Luhmann (1979), they should be seen as ‘complementary ways of absorbing 
complexity and are linked to one another, in the same way as past and future are linked’ 
(p. 20). In familiarity, past experiences are condensed and their continuity assumed, 
which makes future-oriented trust possible:
But rather than just being an inference from the past, trust goes beyond the information it 
receives and risks defi ning the future. The complexity of the future world is reduced by the act 
of trust. In trusting, one engages in action as though there were only certain possibilities in the 
future. (p. 20)
This can be interpreted to mean, on the one hand, that familiarization is a kind of 
hindsight that can strengthen the familiarity base for trust. However, on the other hand, 
I would claim that familiarization is very much future-oriented, too, so that trust in 
general and active trust in particular may be described as the familiarization with the 
future: trust ‘risks defi ning the future’ as Luhmann puts it in the above quotation.
Adam Seligman (1997) develops an elaborate argument on the relationships between 
trust, familiarity and the conditions of modernity which connects in many places with 
Luhmann’s work but gives a very different perspective altogether. He states that famil-
iarity commonly means the actor’s ability to impute the values that condition the ac-
tions of another actor and thus enables the fi rst actor to have expectations towards the 
second. However, he emphasizes throughout his book the ‘unconditionality’ of trust as 
its essential feature, because ‘it involves one in a relation where the acts, character, or 
intentions of the other cannot be confi rmed’ and this means ‘a vulnerability occasioned 
by some form of ignorance or basic uncertainty as to the other’s motives’ (p. 21). The 
freedom of the other and his very otherness are the object of trust. The trust or expects 
not to be harmed, but lacks the means to verify his expectations. Having expressed the 
clear position that unconditional trust cannot be based on conditioning familiarity, 
Seligman offers a surprising twist later on when he introduces the idea that, put simply, 
familiarity in modernity can encompass unconditionality and thus serve as a mecha-
nism that produces system confi dence and enables trust. In other words, the actors in 
modern societies are familiar with the fact that other individuals are to a greater or 
lesser extent unknowable and unconditionable and therefore need to be trusted. Famil-
iarity in modernity, then, also means accepting mutual unconditionality without there-
by removing it. Thus, familiarity is required in forming trusting expectations; familiar-
ization creates familiarity; trust represents a kind of familiarization with the future; but 
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the future, in the sense of the other’s eventual actions and intentions, remains unknow-
able. Within this general position, it is now possible to appreciate the signifi cance of the 
inspiring comments on ‘active trust’ by Giddens (1994b), for whom ‘familiarity is the 
keynote of trust’ (Giddens 1994a: 81) in traditional societies, but who, like Luhmann, 
Seligman and many others, observes an erosion of familiarity as a stable basis for trust-
ful interaction in post-traditional societies and envisages the active constitution of trust 
by late-modern actors.
Refl exive constitution and continuous communication
Giddens (1994b) introduces the term ‘active trust’ very briefl y and somewhat casually 
but nevertheless captures by it an interesting view of the particular mechanisms in-
volved in building trust in late modernity. Where perceived trustworthiness and contex-
tual confi dence become increasingly diffi cult, active trust may be a way out, but it ‘has 
to be energetically treated and sustained’ (p. 187). Without yet calling it ‘active trust’, 
Giddens refers to central ideas behind this concept in some of his earlier writing. For 
example, Giddens (1990) points out that trust needs to be ‘worked upon’ (p. 121; see 
also Giddens, 1991). Active trust implies a refl exive process of trust development, which 
requires continuous communication and openness (see also Beckert 2002). In a manner 
of speaking, this makes every move a fi rst move, because the basis for the relationship 
and trust needs to be constantly reproduced in order to result in a stable or at least con-
tinuous relationship.
Active trust therefore recognizes the autonomy of the other, that is, the freedom to hon-
our or exploit the trust. More and more often, actors have ‘no choice but to make choices’ 
(Giddens 1994b: 187) from what they know to be imperfect decision bases. This, however, 
brings the true nature of trust to the fore, because trust would be ‘frozen’ if it were based 
on compulsion and is only really trust in the face of contingency (Giddens 1994a: 90).
‘All trust is in a certain sense blind trust’, as Giddens (1990: 33, emphasis in original) 
asserts provocatively and thereby highlights probably the most essential feature of trust. 
First, however, it should be noted again that Giddens does not associate the blindness of 
trust with passivity on the part of the trustor. On the contrary, trust ‘has to be worked 
at – the trust of the other has to be won’ (Giddens 1991: 96). Such active trust ‘presumes 
the opening out of the individual to the other’ (Giddens 1990: 121) in the absence of 
external supports for trust (Giddens 1992). Familiarity has to be continuously and re-
fl exively created. Thus, active trust refl ects contingency and change in an ongoing pro-
cess of refl exive constitution.
Giddens’ conceptualization of trust does not contradict his theory of structuration (Gid-
dens 1979, 1984) but he does not draw specifi cally on this theoretical framework when 
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he discusses trust. That it might be quite instructive to do so is demonstrated by Sydow 
(1998), who conceptualizes trust in terms of a modality in the duality and recursiveness 
of structure and (inter)action. The constitution of trust, according to Sydow’s struc-
turation perspective on trust building (see also Sydow / Windeler 2003; Sydow 2006), 
involves the development of interpretative schemes, resources and norms to which the 
actor refers in trustful and trustworthy interaction, thereby (re)producing the social 
structure of signifi cation, domination and legitimation in which the phenomenon of 
trust is constituted and to which further action will refer. Charles Sabel’s (1993) notion 
of ‘studied trust’ fi ts very well with the mechanisms described by Sydow and also with 
Giddens’ concept of active trust (Beckert 2002). Sabel emphasizes the actors’ ability to 
actively work on trust by challenging entrenched interpretations and redefi ning the so-
cial context in such a way that the trust required for cooperation becomes possible (see 
also Maguire et al. 2001; Möllering 2006).
Such a view implies, of course, a processual perspective whereby trust only materializes 
in refl exive social practices which, over time, mostly reproduce trust but may always 
change it as well, either intentionally or unintentionally. While a ‘structuration theory 
of trust’ is effective in describing the constitution of trust and leaves room for the cru-
cial ‘unconditionality’ (Seligman 1997) of trust, it cannot explain clearly how this lat-
ter aspect is handled within trust. In other words, additional concepts are required to 
understand how actors can live with the fact that the ongoing process of structuration 
itself is open-ended – despite or rather because of the actor’s agency, which represents 
the irreducible social contingency without which trust would be neither required nor 
possible but which the trustor treats as if it were resolved. Giddens (1990, 1991) himself 
highlights in connection with the concept of trust a kind of ‘suspension of refl exivity’ 
akin to the suspension of doubt within the natural attitude. Active trust in particular is 
always a kind of trust-in-the-making which requires the trustor to go down an essen-
tially unknowable path. This suspension needs to be looked at more closely.
Suspension: The leap of faith
Trust is only achieved if the prospective trustor can cope with the irreducible social vul-
nerability and uncertainty that rests in the trustee’s principal freedom to either honour 
or exploit trust. The fact that trust is therefore ‘risky’ has been taken far too lightly. This 
is to say that writers on trust commonly point to the element of risk (or uncertainty) 
in trust, but they seldom explore how actors deal with this in practice. I regard this as 
an important omission, because actually, as will be explained in this fi nal section, the 
crucial achievement of trust is that, in trust, the possibility that it might be exploited or 
based on corrupted ‘good reasons’ is suspended but not eliminated. Such a view is rare 
in the literature on trust, but where it can be found it can mostly be traced back to a few 
inspiring passages in the work of Georg Simmel (Misztal 1996; Möllering 2001).
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Georg Simmel does not regard mere weak inductive knowledge as proper trust (Gid-
dens 1991). Within trust there is a ‘further element of socio-psychological quasi-reli-
gious faith’ (Simmel 1990: 179). He fi nds this element ‘hard to describe’ and thinks of 
it as ‘a state of mind which has nothing to do with knowledge, which is both less and 
more than knowledge’; and he expresses this element of faith as ‘an assurance and lack 
of resistance in the surrender of the Ego, which may rest upon particular reasons, but is 
not explained by them’ (Simmel 1990: 179). Trust combines weak inductive knowledge 
with some mysterious, unaccountable faith: ‘On the other hand, even in the social forms 
of confi dence, no matter how exactly and intellectually grounded they may appear to 
be, there may yet be some additional affective, even mystical, “faith” of man in man’ 
(Simmel 1950: 318).
Niklas Luhmann (1979) adopts Simmel’s notion of trust as a ‘blending of knowledge 
and ignorance’ and remarks that ‘trust always extrapolates from the available evidence’ 
(p. 26). However, Luhmann overlooks Simmel’s concern with the element of unac-
countable faith, although he describes the rationale for action based on trust as above 
all ‘a movement towards indifference: by introducing trust, certain possibilities of de-
velopment can be excluded from consideration’ (p. 25). And in line with Simmel he 
notes: ‘Although the one who trusts is never at a loss for reasons and is quite capable of 
giving an account of why he shows trust in this or that case, the point of such reasons is 
really to uphold his self-respect and justify him socially’ (p. 26).
Luhmann’s trust concept includes many elements that resemble Simmel’s transcenden-
tal ideas of trust as an operation that goes beyond that which the actor can account 
and control for. As Poggi (1979) notes, Luhmann argues that ‘successful responses to 
the problem of complexity … typically do not eliminate complexity, but rather reduce 
it: that is, make it “livable with” while in some sense preserving it’ (p. x). Interestingly, 
Poggi also suggests that Luhmann could have used the Hegelian notion of Aufhebung: the 
dialectical principle of synthesis transcending thesis and antithesis, thereby simultane-
ously preserving and rescinding them (Hegel [1807] 1973). And, indeed, Luhmann ar-
gues that trust involves ‘a type of system-internal “suspension” (Aufhebung)’ (Luhmann 
1979: 79).
Giddens (1990), unlike Luhmann, recognizes that Simmel believes that trust differs 
from weak inductive knowledge insofar as it ‘presumes a leap to commitment, a qual-
ity of “faith” which is irreducible’ (Giddens 1991: 19). This commitment would often 
be characterized more by the habitual and passive acceptance of circumstances than by 
an active leap (Giddens 1990: 90). The latter, however, is typical for the ‘active trust’ in 
late-modern societies (Giddens 1994b). Giddens (1990) argues that the suspension that 
enables trust has to be learned in infancy through the ambivalent experience of love 
from caretakers on the one hand and the caretakers’ temporary absence on the other, 
whereby the infant develops the ability to reach a state of trust which ‘brackets distance 
in time and space and so blocks off existential anxieties’ (p. 97). This trust as a kind of 
skill learned in infancy remains essential as actors grow up to become adults. According 
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to Giddens, the faith in the loving caretaker’s return ‘is the essence of that leap to com-
mitment which basic trust – and all forms of trust thereafter – presumes’ (p. 95). The 
infant’s anxiety can be generalized to the problem of ignorance that actors face in any 
social encounters with others whose actions and intentions they cannot fully know or 
control (Giddens 1991). Trust, as the ‘solution’, requires faith in the sense of a more or 
less active leap to commitment.
This brings us to Luhmann’s (1979) remark that trust is an ‘operation of the will’ (p. 
32). Trust goes beyond that which can be justifi ed in any terms by the actor, but the ac-
tor exercises agency through his will to either suspend uncertainty and vulnerability or 
not. Luhmann’s reference to ‘will’ in the context of trust and suspension inspires a closer 
look at William James’ essay on The Will to Believe, a pragmatist approach to the theme 
of faith which Jens Beckert (2005) has also identifi ed as highly instructive for under-
standing trust. James ([1896] 1948) defends the actor’s right to believe even when there 
is no conclusive evidence – in religious matters but also generally, for instance in social 
relations. Such a belief would be called faith: ‘we have the right to believe at our own 
risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will’ (p. 107). Note that by introduc-
ing the condition that the hypothesis has to be ‘live enough’, James points out that actors 
should not be allowed to believe anything but that ‘which appeals as a real possibility to 
him to whom it is proposed’ (p. 89). Implicitly, he thus refers back to his essay The Senti-
ment of Rationality (James [1879] 1948) and major principles of his pragmatist philoso-
phy. In this earlier source, he says that faith is ‘synonymous with working hypothesis’ (p. 
25). The ability to have faith is distinctly human according to James and he defi nes faith 
as follows: ‘Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still possible; 
and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act 
in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certifi ed to us in advance’ (p. 22).
From the standpoint of James’ pragmatism, faith requires the ‘sentiment of rational-
ity’, in other words the actor’s genuine but not conclusively justifi able conviction that 
what he believes is ‘true’ in the pragmatist sense of being useful, giving expectations and 
(thus) enabling action. This sentiment produces the ‘will’ to believe. Faith in these terms 
matches exactly that element in trust which – like a ‘tranquilizer’ (Beckert 2005: 18) 
– allows the trustor to have favourable expectations towards the actions and intentions 
of others whose behaviour cannot be fully known or controlled. I call this element ‘sus-
pension’ (Möllering 2001: 414), meaning the ‘leap of faith’ which brackets ignorance 
and doubt thereby enabling the trustor, at least momentarily, to have expectations as 
if social vulnerability and uncertainty were resolved. Note that the ‘as if ’ implies genu-
ine faith here and is therefore radically different from Hardin’s notion of strategically 
feigned ‘as-if trust’ (see also Möllering 2006). In suspension, a complex notion of simul-
taneously powerful and vulnerable agency is acknowledged. 
26 MPIfG Discussion Paper 05 / 13
Conclusions and implications
In this paper, I have investigated three main questions from the perspective of sociologi-
cal neoinstitutionalism and related approaches: What does it mean to say that institu-
tions are a basis for trust? How can we deal with the issue that institutions are both 
sources and objects of trust? And what is the role and signifi cance of agency in the con-
stitution of trust? By way of conclusion, I summarize my answers to these questions.
First, institutions are a basis for trust between actors because they imply a high degree 
of taken-for-grantedness, which enables shared expectations to arise even between ac-
tors who have no mutual experience or history of interaction. In the fi rst instance, this 
approach is based on the phenomenological assumption that actors are ‘looking at the 
world from within the natural attitude’ (Schütz 1967: 98), relying on ‘constitutive ex-
pectancies’ (Garfi nkel 1963: 190) and the validity of institutionalized rules, roles and 
routines. However, this approach does afford the actor an active role in interpreting 
– and questioning – institutions.
Second, because actors are not seen as passive reproducers of structure, institution-
based trust between actors requires that the institutions on which such trust is based 
are ‘trusted’ themselves. In other words, institutions are both a source and an object 
of trust. Here, the notions of ‘system trust’ (Luhmann 1979) and ‘trust in abstract sys-
tems’ (Giddens 1990) come into play, conceptualizing how actors develop confi dence 
in institutions. While there cannot be absolute certainty, actors learn about the reli-
ability of institutions through direct experience and through mediated demonstrations 
that institutions ‘work’. However, once again agency is at the core of this version of a 
neoinstitutional theory of trust because actors are involved more or less consciously in 
processes of institutionalization and may seek to infl uence institutions in an entrepre-
neurial way.
Third, the last point shows that the signifi cance of (institutionally embedded) agency 
in the constitution of trust lies in the assumption that actors (re)produce collectively 
the institutional framework, which then serves them as a source for trust (in other ac-
tors) while becoming an object of trust (in institutions), too. The notion of ‘active trust’ 
(Giddens 1994b) captures this creative and processual aspect of trust most clearly and 
points to the key theoretical fi nding that agency on the part of the trustor implies a leap 
of faith that needs to be made in the face of irreducible social uncertainty and vulnera-
bility. If this need for ‘suspension’ could be rendered obsolete by institutions or rational 
cognition, then trust would be deterministic and, therefore, a pointless category.
In the process of answering the above questions, I have rediscovered and, indeed, re-
covered some conceptual foundations for trust, which can be found relatively far back 
in the literature by looking at the details of some seminal writings that inform neo-
institutional approaches to trust. Most of these are, clearly, not part of the mainstream 
of trust research in the social sciences, not even in areas where institutional theories 
Möllering: Understanding Trust from the Perspective of Sociological Neoinstitutionalism 27
have gained a certain prominence. What is more, the concepts outlined here, such as the 
natural attitude, isomorphism, routines, active trust, familiarization and suspension, 
should be seen as core elements of trust rather than fringe considerations. What makes 
trust unique is not just the vast variety of potential trust bases – none of which should 
be overlooked – but, more importantly, the fact that trust is a phenomenon capturing 
how actors use their embedded agency to deal with the irreducible social vulnerability 
and uncertainty without which one could not speak of ‘trust’.
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